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THE ADVANCEMENT OF ETHICS.

BY the “advancement of ethics” we mean two things :

I. Substitution of universalism for individualism, as the ground-principle of ethical theory. That is, scientific development of the truth, now everywhere admitted as a truism, that society is an organism—that the life of the individual and the life of society are one organic life, and possess no ethical significance except as lived each in and through the other.

II. Substitution of objective justice for all merely subjective considerations, as the ground-principle of ethical practice. That is, on the one hand, recognition by the individual of the social ideal as the “higher law” of all individual conduct, and, on the other hand, recognition by society of the personal ideal as the “higher law” of all associated conduct ; in other words, free self-government of the individual by the social ideal, and free self-government of society by the personal ideal, as the only possible means of realizing the peculiar and complex ethical constitution of the community as an organism of persons, of which the paramount law is equal objective justice.

I.

No ethical theory could possibly exclude from recognition the great fact of society, since, in the last analysis, all ethical relations are social relations. Philosophy may possibly be (though it has never yet consistently been) idealistic ; but, by the confession of idealists themselves, ethics must be realistic, and it can never take on a thoroughly scientific character until it knows its own philosophical ground to be realism pure and simple. The reason is self-

evident. Ethical relations are possible only among ethically constituted beings, that is, persons, each of whom must exist, and be known to exist, "in and for himself ;" but this principle of equal independence and reciprocal objectivity among co-existent persons is, just so far, "realism" in the philosophical meaning of the word. Hence no ethical theory has ever been presented which did not recognize the real existence of human society as its own necessary presupposition, and find in that real existence the possibility of its own existence as a theory.

The difference between universalism and individualism in ethics, therefore, is not that between affirming and denying the fact of human society, which is the universal and necessary foundation of all ethical systems. The difference lies in differently conceiving the ultimate purpose or ideal end of human life in general. All ethical systems are individualistic which identify the ultimate end of individual life with the *ethical welfare of the individual as such*—all are universalistic which identify it with the *ethical welfare of society as a whole in which the individual is a part*. The difference is a difference of moral ideals. To make this plain, and to show that the advancement of ethics, both theoretical and practical, requires adoption of the larger ideal, is the aim of the present article.

II.

That the prevailing tendency of ethical systems, whether as considered in themselves or as illustrated in the actual life of the world, has been hitherto individualistic, not universalistic, appears alike from the history of ethical speculation, from the conduct of mankind at large, and from the traditional exclusion of politics from ethics both in theory and in practice. Nay, it appears with great distinctness in the essential conception of the science of ethics itself, as defined by one of the highest modern authorities in this department: "Physics is concerned with what is, has been, or will be ; ethics with what is 'good,' or what 'ought to be,' and its opposite. We must add, however, that the good that ethics investigates is 'good for man,' to distinguish it from universal or absolute good, which is the subject-matter of theology or ontology ; and again, if

we are to separate ethics from politics, we must introduce a further qualification, and define the former as the study of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered as individuals. . . So again the connection between ethics and politics is naturally very intimate. . . Still it is manifest that the good of an individual man can be separated as an object of study from the good of his community; so that the ethical point of view has to be distinguished from the political, however large a field the two studies may have in common. . . To sum up, the subject of ethics, most comprehensively understood, includes (1) an investigation of the constituents and conditions of the Good or Wellbeing of men considered individually, which chiefly takes the form of an examination into the general nature and particular species of (*a*) Virtue or (*b*) Pleasure, and the chief means of realizing these ends; (2) an investigation of the principles and most important details of Duty or the Moral Law (so far as this is distinguished from Virtue); (3) some inquiry into the nature and origin of the Faculty by which duty is recognized; (4) some examination of the question of human Free Will.”¹ Here the exclusion of politics and sociology from the proper field of ethics, and the limitation of strictly ethical consideration to the individual as such, are sufficiently manifest.

A glance at the history of ethics confirms Professor Sidgwick's statement, so far as it relates to the past. The pagan ideal in general was strictly an ideal of the individual as such, *totus, teres, atque rotundus*. In the Orient, ethics culminated in the attributes of the “superior man” of Confucius and Mencius, and in the Buddha or “awakened man” so tersely described and vividly pictured in the last two verses of the Dhammapada :

“The manly, the noble, the hero, the great sage, the conqueror, the guileless, the master, the awakened, him I call indeed a Brâhmana. He who knows his former abodes, who sees heaven and hell, has reached the end of births, is perfect in knowledge and a sage, he whose perfections are all perfect, him I call indeed a Brâhmana.”

The main object of ethical speculation in Greece and Rome was to determine the essential qualities of the “sage” or “philosopher”

¹ Prof. H. Sidgwick, art. “Ethics,” *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th ed.

—the ideal man in whom was to be realized actually (*ἐνεργείᾳ*) the universal humanity inhering potentially (*δυναμει*) in each human individual. In this Græco-Roman ideal of the “universal individual” as the “sage,” the student of history will at once recognize a perfectly consistent application to ethics of the central conception of Greek philosophy, which, germinating in Socrates and Plato, found its ripened expression in the theory of universals or leading metaphysical principle of Aristotle: namely, that the pure universal, or Form, inheres in the individual, or union of Form with Matter, as at once efficient cause, final cause, and formal cause or constitutive essence (*τό τι ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία*). The essential marks of the “sage” were variously conceived by conflicting schools; but, however conceived or named, whether by Platonists, Aristotelians, Cynics and Stoics, Cyrenaics and Epicureans, Neo-Pythagoreans, Neo-Platonists, or what not, the various constituent rays of human perfection came to a focus solely in the typical individual as such, in the “sage” or Perfect Man, and, being essentially individual attributes or qualities, were inapplicable to society except as a mere arithmetical sum of individuals as such. Similarly, the ethical ideal of Christianity from the beginning has been still an ideal of the individual as such—the “saint,” the ideal Perfect Man prefigured by the traditionally real Perfect Man of Palestine; while the constitution of its politico-social ideal of the “kingdom of heaven” is too intimately blended with supernatural elements to admit, perhaps, of a rigorously philosophical treatment.

Omitting particular mention (for which there is here no room) of the numerous ethical systems of the modern period, it must suffice for present purposes to point out that the two great schools of modern ethics, the intuitional or disinterested and the associational or utilitarian, agree in limiting the proper sphere of ethics to the conduct of the individual as such, who is to be conceived ideally either as the “good man” or as the “happy man”; and that they divide merely on the question whether the ultimate ground of the individual’s moral activity should be (1) disinterested individual intuitions of absolute right or (2) interested individual calculations of utility or expediency. In the one case, the only recognized ethical pur-

pose of life is to be individually "good,"—in the other case, to be individually "happy"; but, in both cases, in the former no less than in the latter, the only ethical end is inevitably reflected back at last upon the Self, and cannot be ultimately realized except in the individual as such.

It is clear, however, that, judged strictly by its own principles, the disinterested school fails to be consistently disinterested and the utilitarian school fails to be consistently utilitarian. On the one hand, when the individual makes his own goodness the supreme aim of his life, he is evidently not disinterested, however exalted may be the form which his self-interest or self-love may assume. Even "virtue for virtue's sake," if *my* virtue alone is my aim, becomes necessarily, in fact, merely "virtue for *my* sake." Clearly, I cannot reach disinterestedness on any such line as that, or on any self-returning line. The intuitionist's criticism of the utilitarian tellingly recoils upon himself; "Self is the centre of his system; regard for self shapes and colors it from first to last. The 'Ethics' are Aristotle's answer to the question, 'How is man to be happy?' It is a lofty selfishness. There is nothing sordid, nothing gross about it. It marks as by a high-water line how high ideal selfishness can be raised. But it is genuine, unalloyed selfishness, and this lies at the very core of the philosophy."¹ On the other hand, in order to avoid a naked and brutal egoism, the more recent utilitarianism sets up quite arbitrarily the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," or some other combination of the "general happiness" with "individual happiness," as a genuinely utilitarian ideal, in the vain hope of effecting a "compromise" between egoism and altruism. For instance, Mr. Spencer lays down this as his universal principle in ethics:

"No school can avoid taking for the ultimate moral aim a desirable state of feeling called by whatever name—gratification, enjoyment, happiness. Pleasure somewhere, at some time, to some being or beings, is an inexpugnable element of the conception. It is as much a necessary form of moral intuition as space is a necessary form of intellectual intuition."²

¹ Rev. I. Gregory Smith, *Chief Ancient Philosophies—Aristotelianism*, London, 1889, p. 46.

² *Data of Ethics*, p. 46.

Utilitarianism, then, requires me *invariably to will happiness*. But Mr. Spencer thus states his "compromise":

"Clearly, our conclusion must be that general happiness is to be achieved mainly through the adequate pursuit of their own happiness by individuals; while, reciprocally, the happinesses of individuals are to be achieved in part by their pursuit of the general happiness."¹

This "compromise" works well enough, so long as, in willing the general happiness, I will, also, my own happiness. But, in every test instance of real (not merely apparent) self-sacrifice, I am compelled to will either (1) my own happiness at the expense of others, or (2) my own unhappiness for the benefit of others. In the first case, I do not will the general unhappiness: if this follows, it is brought about against my will by the natural law of cause and effect; I may deplore it, and suffer, through sympathy, some diminution of the happiness I will. But, in the second case, I positively will my own unhappiness, which has no cause whatever save my own volition. Consequently, since utilitarianism requires me *invariably to will happiness*, it requires me in every test instance *never to will my own unhappiness*, no matter what becomes of others beyond the sphere of my own will; it can never require me to will *contrary* to what it declares so emphatically to be the "ultimate moral aim." This is total collapse of the "compromise"—reduction of utilitarianism to that naked and brutal egoism which it seeks in vain to avoid, and which is the inexorable condition of its own self-consistency. When utilitarianism teaches that happiness as such is the "ultimate moral aim" and that goodness is merely one among many means to this supreme end, it follows that by no possibility can I find a reason in utility why I should even postpone, much less sacrifice, the most beggarly fraction of my own pleasure to the massed bliss of all mankind. If I am of a sympathetic temperament, I may indeed find a utilitarian reason for apparent (not real) self-sacrifice; but, if, like multitudes, I am naturally unsympathetic, the principle of utility requires me to will the only happiness I can understand, and buy a moment's delight at the possible cost of misery to mil-

¹ *Data of Ethics*, p. 238.

lions. To a consistent utilitarianism, the "greatest happiness of the greatest number" is an impossible ideal, unless the "greatest number" is "Number One."

Two modern systems, however, from their exceptional importance, demand a brief special mention.

Kant, perhaps more weightily and impressively than any other philosopher since Aristotle, lays the supreme emphasis in ethics on the individual as such. "Nothing in all the world, indeed nothing outside of it," he declares, "can possibly be held to be unqualifiedly good, with the single exception of a *Good Will*."¹ Duty he defines as the necessity of performing every action out of pure veneration for the moral law;² and the law of duty itself he formulates in the world-famous "categorical imperative," which (be it noticed) is addressed to the individual, and to the individual alone: "So act, as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a universal law of Nature."³ This principle that "the will of every rational being" is "a universally legislating will"⁴ is still further explained as follows:

"The will, therefore, is not simply subjected to the moral law, but so subjected that it must also be considered *as self-legislating*, and as subjected to the law for that very reason above all, since it must be itself regarded as the original author of that law."⁵

It may strike the reader, perhaps, that, just as no Congress, Parliament, or other legislative body, can irrevocably bind either itself or its successor, so no autonomous will at one moment can bind itself irrevocably at another moment—that the power to enact is, likewise, the power to repeal; and it may seem strange to him that Kant should overlook so formidable an objection. But, according to Kant's profound thought, the individual will which legislates or enacts so absolutely its own moral law is not precisely the same individual will which is bound by that law: the *legislative will* is that

¹ *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Werke, IV. 241, ed. Hartenstein.

² *Ibid.*, p. 248.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 269, cf. Werke, V. 32, VII. 22, 192, and *passim*

⁴ Werke, IV. 279.

⁵ Werke, IV. 279.

of the universal I, the universal rational will or abstract humanity (*homo noumenon, die reine Vernunft*) which is immanent in the individual as such, while the *subject will* is that of the empirical I, the concrete individual himself (*homo phaenomenon, der mit Vernunft begabte Sinnenmensch*); and Kant himself calls attention to this "two-fold personality" or "doubled self" of the I, when it is compelled to appear in the court of conscience as at the same time both Accuser and Accused.¹ Whether this subtile distinction is successful or not, Kant's ethical principle is perfectly plain: namely, that the individual as such, in virtue of the universal humanity immanent in him, is the sole and absolute source of the universal moral law, by which he freely binds himself and by which he himself is yet necessarily bound—in other words, that there is no moral law at all, either above him or in any sense outside of him, by which he either is bound or can possibly be bound in the least degree. This central conception of *a universally self-legislating individual as such* is not only laid down by Kant as the cardinal principle of his entire ethics, but also made to explain the failure of every antecedent ethical system:

"When, therefore, we look back upon all previous efforts ever made to discover the principle of morality, there is no cause for wondering why they have all without exception failed. It was seen that, through his duty, the individual is bound by the moral law; but it occurred to no one that the individual is subjected to a legislation which is *solely his own* and yet *universal*, and that he is only bound to act according to a will which is at once his own, and yet, by Nature's plan, universally legislative. . . I will therefore call this fundamental proposition the principle of *Autonomy*, in contradistinction to every other, which I will for this reason describe as *Heteronomy*."²

It is easy to perceive that Kant's cardinal principle of "Autonomy,"—that is, the immanence in each individual man of the supreme legislative will of universal humanity, as the exclusive seat and source of all moral obligation,—is only a new application of a very old principle, only an application to ethics of the Aristotelian theory of universals in metaphysics. To Aristotle, as we saw above, the pure universal, as Form, inheres in the concrete individual, as

¹ Werke, VII. 245, footnote.

² Werke, IV. 281.

union of Form with Matter ; and this principle of the inherence or immanence of the Universal in the Individual, as its self-evolving essence and self-realizing end, is Aristotle's original and characteristic theory of universals—perhaps the most potent and fruitful theory ever propounded in philosophy, for it has dominated the entire development and written itself out legibly in the entire history of subsequent speculation. Similarly, to Kant, as we have also seen, the pure universal, as Rational Will, inheres in the concrete individual, as union of Rational Will with Sensibility (in Kant's own precise and pregnant phrase, *der mit Vernunft begabte Sinnenmensch*); and this is Kant's probably unconscious application to ethics of the Aristotelian metaphysics. The undeniable fact, therefore, that his whole ethical theory revolves about the individual as such, is now seen to have a rational explanation, and at least an historical justification, in the other undeniable fact that all modern philosophy has sprung from the Aristotelian root.

Hegel, the great thinker in whom German idealism came to its culminating point, was essentially the historical continuator of Kant through Fichte and Schelling, and renders this general relationship very apparent in his ethical theory. He, too, makes the individual as such the heliocentric fact of ethics, and, no less than Kant, proclaims in the most unqualified way the "Autonomy" of the individual will as Conscience:

"One may speak of abstract Duty in very exalted general terms, and this mode of speaking elevates the individual and expands his heart ; but, when it arrives at nothing definite, it becomes at last tedious. The mind demands some particular application, to which it is entitled. On the other hand, Conscience is that deepest inward solitude with oneself, that absolute retirement into oneself, in which everything external, everything definite, vanishes. The individual, as Conscience, is no longer shackled by particular aims, and this, consequently, is a lofty standpoint, a standpoint of the modern world, which has first reached this consciousness, this submersion in oneself [that is, this self-extinction of the sensuous in the rational individuality]. The preceding more sensuous ages have before them something external or given, whether Religion or Right ; but Conscience knows itself as Thought, and knows that my own thought is that which alone imposes on me a moral obligation [*dieses mein Denken das allein für mich Verpflichtende ist*]. . . 'Conscience' expresses the absolute title of the subjective self consciousness, namely, to know *in itself* and *from itself* what is Right and Duty, and to recognize nothing else than

what it thus knows as the Good, maintaining at the same time that what it thus knows and wills is Right and Duty *in truth*. Considered as this union of subjective knowledge and objective existence in and for itself, Conscience is a sanctity which it would be sacrilege to assail."¹

In these unequivocal and emphatic terms, Hegel declares the absolute ethical independence of the individual as such. He, like Kant, makes the individual a universally self-legislating will, concentrates all moral obligation in its self-imposed law, and thus denies even to the "objective spirit," the universal reason of the world as objectified in the State, any ethical authority over the subjective conscience of the individual as such. The individual conscience may be, and often is, deluded; it is by no means infallible; but it is, nevertheless, Hegel's absolute and ultimate appeal in ethics. To be sure, he immediately proceeds to add:

"Whether, however, the conscience of a particular individual is in accordance with this idea of Conscience,—whether that which it holds or declares to be good is also really good,—this is known solely from the *content* of what is thus held or declared to be good. What is Right and Duty, considered as that will-determination which is rational in and for itself, is not essentially the particular property of an individual and does not exist essentially in the form of feeling or any individual (that is, sensuous) knowledge; it exists essentially in the form of *universal* determinations of thought, that is, in the form of *laws* and *rules*. The individual conscience, therefore, is subjected to this judgment, namely, whether it is *true* or not; and its appeal merely *to its Self* is immediately opposed to that which it intends to be—the rule of a mode of conduct which shall be rational, universal, and valid in and for itself. For this reason the State cannot recognize the conscience in its peculiar form as *subjective knowledge*, any more than science can concede validity to mere subjective opinion, assertion of or appeal to mere subjective opinion."²

Hegel goes on, later, to define the ethical conception of the State as follows:

"The State is the rational in and for itself, considered as the reality of the substantial *Will*; and this reality it has in the particular *Self-consciousness*, exalted to its own universality [i. e. Kant's universally self-legislating will]. This substantial unity is the absolute and unmoved aim of the Self, in which freedom comes to its highest right; just as this same substantial unity, the final aim of Society, has

¹*Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke, VIII. 177-181.

²*Ibid.*, p. 181.

the highest right against individuals, whose *highest duty* it is to be fellow-members of the State."¹

Further :

"The State has the right and the form of self-conscious and objective rationality, the right to enforce it and to maintain it against contentions which arise out of the *subjective* form of truth, with whatever confidence and authority this may envelop itself."²

All this sets up the State as another absolute and ultimate authority in ethics, as an objective, universal, and rational will which has the right to enforce itself against the subjective will of any individual. But, clearly, what we have here, as Hegel's highest teaching in ethics, is the mere possibility of a deadlock of wills, an irreconcilable conflict of wills between the individual and the State. This conflict, this deadlock, is left absolutely without remedy, because there is no higher will—because to Hegel the State, as "objective spirit," is itself the highest will of all : in his own words:

"The State is the reality of the ethical Idea,—the ethical Spirit, as the *manifest*, self-clear, substantial Will, which thinks and knows itself, and executes what it knows and in so far as it knows it."³

True, it is the individual's "highest duty," as we have seen, "to be a fellow-member of the State," provided, however, that he himself recognizes it as such. But if otherwise, if he fails to recognize it (and there are to-day too many sincere and honest anarchists to permit such a supposition to be impatiently poohpoohed), then Hegel gives *no moral reason whatever* why the individual should submit his thought to the thought of the State or his will to the will of the State ; for he declares unqualifiedly that "my own thought is that which alone imposes on me a moral obligation." In that declaration lies the quintessence of anarchy, as the fundamental principle of the Hegelian ethics,—the apotheosis of the individual as such, and the absolute overthrow of the State. Even in deciding whether the individual conscience "is true or not," the individual himself is Hegel's final appeal : the individual must answer that question *for himself*, and all that the State can do is to crush him.

¹ Ibid., p. 313.

² Ibid., p. 343.

³ Ibid., p. 342.

For it has no higher authority to invoke than absolute brute force; the legislation of the "objective spirit" cannot supersede the absolute self-legislation of the individual conscience, as the ground of individual conduct; the universal human reason which realizes itself in the domestic, civil, and political constitution of the State has no moral authority over me, if "my own thought is that which alone imposes on me a moral obligation." Hence Hegel well epitomizes his ethics of individualism in these significant words: "At the apex of all actions, even including world-historical actions, stand *Individuals*, as subjectivities which realize the substantial [i. e. the universal and substantial will of the objective spirit]." ¹

It is no accident, therefore, that the inadequacy of the Hegelian conception of the organic State—"the State," he says, "is an organism, that is, the development of the Idea in its differences" ²—betrays itself in Hegel's strange and strained identification of the social ideal with the actually subsisting state of society, or rather in his somewhat contemptuous dismissal of the ethical ideal altogether. The general maxim of his philosophy, that "whatever is rational is real and whatever is real is rational," when applied to his ethics, might well read, "whatever is good is real and whatever is real is good." This is certainly the spirit and drift of such utterances as these:

"The separation of Reality from the Idea is particularly fascinating to the mere understanding, which mistakes the dreams of its own abstractions for something true, and is vain of its *Ought*, which it is specially fond of prescribing in the field of politics, as if the world had waited for the mere understanding to learn how it ought to be, but is not; if the world were as it ought to be, where would the understanding's precocity find room for exercise? . . . Philosophy has to do with the Idea, which is not so powerless as merely to know an Ought and not also to be what it ought." ³

And again:

"Like empiricism, philosophy, too, knows only what is: it knows no such thing as what merely *ought* to exist, and therefore *does not* exist." ⁴

¹ Ibid., p. 434.

² Ibid., p. 331.

³ *Encyklopädie*, Werke, VI. 11.

⁴ Ibid., p. 80.

Since ethics, as Professor Sidgwick has well defined it above, deals solely with "what is 'good' or what 'ought to be,' and its opposite," one may well ask how such a philosophy as Hegel's comes to have any ethics at all. Such ethics as it has, however, revolves in the last analysis about the individual as such: for the ostensible subordination of the individual to the "objective spirit" means nothing, when the ultimate appeal against the aberrant "subjective conscience" of the individual lies necessarily, as we have seen, to the individual himself.

It is just as easy to perceive in the case of Hegel as in the case of Kant, that the root of all this ethical individualism is the old Aristotelian theory of universals in metaphysics. Hegel's fundamental principle is that the universal is real in the individual alone, and that the individual is real in so far only as it realizes and contains the universal: the universal is in the individual, *because it inheres in it as its immanent self-determining essence*, and the individual is in the universal, *so far, and so far only, as it is subsumed under it as the one universal nature or essence of all individuals*. Insight into this principle is the key to all comprehension of Hegel. He expresses it plainly enough over and over again. In the logic, for instance, he says of the Notion:

"Its *universal* nature gives external reality to itself through *particularity*, and thereby, and as negative reflection into itself, makes itself an *individual*. Or, conversely, the Real is an *individual*, which raises itself through *particularity* into *universality*, and makes itself identical with itself."¹

Similarly, in the ethics, explaining his definition of the State as "that which is rational in and for itself," he says:

"Considered abstractly, rationality consists in general in the all-interpenetrating unity of universality and individuality; and here, considered concretely according to its content, it consists in the unity of (1) objective freedom, that is, the universal substantial will, and (2) subjective freedom, as the individual knowledge and its will, seeking particular aims. For this reason, according to its form, rationality consists in an activity determining itself according to laws and rules which are *thought*, i. e. *universal*. This Idea is that Being of the Spirit which is eternal and necessary in and for itself."²

¹*Encyklopädie*, Werke, VI. 345. (The italics are Hegel's own.)

²*Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke, VIII. 313.

The substantial identity of this doctrine with Aristotle's is too clear for controversy. To Aristotle, the pure universal Form inheres in the concrete union of Form with Matter. To Hegel, the pure universal Thought, Conscience, or Person,¹ inheres in the individual man, as concrete union of Thought with Sense ("this individual I,"² the same as Kant's more explicit "sense-man endowed with reason;" for Hegel had not the hardihood to deny the fact of sensation, much as it conflicted with his principle that thought is "the universal substance of the spiritual"³). The fact, therefore, that Hegel's ethical system, like Kant's, revolves about the individual as such, and that he, like Kant, discovers no universal moral obligation other than that which lies concentrated in the essential common nature realized immanently in each and every individual, is historically explicable by the fact that both build alike on one and the same foundation in the Aristotelian theory of universals. The proof of this is that both arrive essentially at one and the same ethical principle, summing up the supreme rule of Duty in a canon which tersely prescribes *individual perfection*, in the form of a sole and sufficient *personal ideal*: Kant in his "practical imperative," "Act so as to treat humanity, whether in thy own person or in the person of every other, as always an End, never as a Means alone!"⁴ and Hegel in his "mandate of ethical law," "Be a person, and respect others as persons!"⁵ These noble precepts, be it understood, declare a personal ideal for the individual as such, but no social ideal whatever; they are addressed to the individual alone; and in them culminates the ethics of individualism.

III.

How confused and confusing is the present state of ethical theory, may be best illustrated, perhaps, from the preface to Professor Bowne's *Principles of Ethics*. In this preface the author says:

¹ "Person" does not mean to Hegel the whole man, but only "the abstract will, existing for itself." (*Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke, VIII. 74.)

² *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Werke, II. 78.

³ *Encyklopädie*, Werke, VI. 46.

⁴ *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, Werke, IV. 277.

⁵ *Philosophie des Rechts*, Werke, VIII. 75.

"Moral philosophy has been with us from the beginning ; but moral theory still fails to get on. According to Rousseau, Socrates defined justice, but men had been just before. It is a happy circumstance, and one very full of comfort, that, in the great bulk of duties that make up life, men of good will can find their way without a moral theory."

The whole ethical question is here most innocently begged. Who is "the man of good will"? Clearly, the man who wills the good, that is, so directs his will as to realize the good. But the directing aim of his will is his ideal, his formed thought of the good, and this formed thought of the good is precisely his "moral theory." Hence "men of good will" *cannot* "find their way without a moral theory." In fact, no man can will at all without a moral theory ; no man can will without willing some particular end, and no man is a moral being who is not compelled, by a power from which there is no escape, to judge his own ends as good or bad ; and the principle by which he judges them, whether lofty or degraded, is *his* moral theory.

The great trouble with the world, the chief reason why there is so much easily preventable evil in society, is the fact that so many men's moral theories are so miserably bad. Knowledge of good and evil is indeed not virtue ; yet there can be no virtue without knowledge of good and evil. Just so far as ignorance works wrong in the world, just so far is the world suffering from lack of a true and universally adopted moral theory.

If, then, "moral theory still fails to get on," and the fact is patent enough, may it not be due to the other fact that moral theory still cleaves so pertinaciously to its half-principle of individualism? For individualism is false in its halfness alone ; it is the truth in it which has kept it so long alive. But the ancient Aristotelian theory of universals, out of which individualism in modern ethics and in modern philosophy originally sprang, has already yielded to a larger truth in modern science ; and for this reason modern science is a schoolmaster whom modern philosophy and modern ethics do themselves incalculable wrong to ignore. This is not the place for dwelling on the point ; that must wait. But it is necessary to state succinctly, though only in part, what is that enlarged theory of univer-

sals which modern science has already substituted for the Aristotelian theory—which, however, it has not yet formulated in distinct terms or even distinctly conceived as a new, universal, and revolutionizing principle.

It is the capital error of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and modern idealism in general, that *the universal inheres in the individual*; but it is an error which modern science has already outgrown. Most certainly, there is a common essential nature to be found in all things of a kind, but this common essential nature is not the kind; most certainly, there is a real community of constitution in all specimens of a species, but this real community of constitution is not the species. True, this common essential nature, this real community of constitution, can be separately conceived, dropping out of view all other elements of the real individual being in which alone it has a real existence; but it is then a pure abstraction, and this abstract concept is not the real universal to the real individual. The real universal to the real individual is the totality of all the individuals, not merely as an aggregate, but also as an individual of a higher order.¹

For instance, there is a certain common lion-nature which is found in every lion, abstracted in the concept, and uttered in the definition; but all lions together constitute the species lion, and the species lion is an individual of a higher order to the genus cat. Hence to the individual lion the real universal is, not the common lion-nature, which does indeed inhere in every lion and is abstracted in the concept, but (1) all lions as an *aggregate universal* of individuals, and (2) all lions as a *single universal* (the one species lion) in the higher universal (the one genus cat). With good reason, therefore, the scientific class-name of “the lion” includes both the species and the genus, as “cat-lion” (*Felis leo*). Thus the theory of philosophical idealism, which identifies the universal with the common essential nature, holds with perfect consistency that the universal inheres in the individual; while the theory of Scientific

¹ Mr. Spencer half expresses this new scientific conception of the universal, when he says: “It is true that the species has no existence save as an aggregate of individuals” (*Justice*, p. 6).

Realism, which identifies the universal with the totality of its individuals as one species, holds with equal self-consistency that the individual inheres in the universal. The ethical outcome of the first theory, as has been shown above, is ethical individualism; the ethical outcome of the second theory, as remains to be shown, is ethical universalism.

But the needed advancement of ethics from individualism to universalism will be deprived of one of the strongest arguments in its favor, unless it is briefly indicated how this same advancement has already been achieved in modern science.

Holding that the universal is the sole object of science, and conceiving it to be simply the essential nature common to all its individuals and immanent in each of them, Aristotle was obliged to reject from scientific consideration all that does not belong to that common nature. This he explicitly declares: "Mere particulars are innumerable, and cannot be known [τὸ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον ἄπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν]." But, in consequence of thus rejecting all mere particulars as unknowable, there was left to be known merely the uniformities of things, merely their common essential natures abstracted from all their individual peculiarities; and thus the individual differences which distinguish one thing from another of the same kind lost all scientific value. The result of this view was that the common essential nature stood out alone, absolutely identical in all individuals and absolutely unchangeable in the succession of generations. In other words, the Aristotelian theory of universals was the rational and historical root of the doctrine of the *immutability of species*.

It was the transcendent service and imperishable glory of Darwin to succeed in establishing the scientific value, discredited and lost by Aristotle, of the *individual difference*. Conceiving the individual difference as the "spontaneous variation" (which he did not pretend to account for), and perceiving that it is scientifically no less important than the common essential nature, Darwin founded on it his revolutionizing theory of natural selection. For (notwithstanding Weismann and his school) it is the advantageous individual "variation" or "adaptation" which, being transmitted by hered-

ity, multiplied and spread by a long series of generations, and finally incorporated thereby in the common essential nature itself, at last transforms the species and alone accounts for the derivation of one species from another. This vast revolution in biology, establishing the *mutability of species*, has a still profounder meaning in philosophy. The change from Aristotle to Darwin was a change from the Aristotelian conception of the *abstract universal*, as the common essential nature *minus* all the differences of individuals, to the scientific conception of the *concrete universal*, as the common essential nature *plus* all the differences of individuals,—that is, as the real totality of all the real individuals in the species or real universal. Hence the Darwinian revolution in biology, by its necessary implications, is the greatest forward step in philosophy since Aristotle. It finds its philosophical expression in a complete reversal of the leading principle of the Aristotelian, Kantian, and Hegelian philosophies, and declares that the universal does not inhere in the individual, but that, on the contrary, the individual inheres in the universal. And it finds its ethical expression in the substitution of universalism for individualism, as the ground-principle of ethical theory.

What, then, is the meaning of universalism in ethics? To answer this question, nothing is needed but full comprehension of the principle, acknowledged to-day with scarcely a dissenting voice, that “society is an organism.” For the organism is the ethical universal itself.

Kant never laid succeeding thinkers under a heavier debt of gratitude than when he analyzed the organism as such.¹ The defects of his analysis are those of the Aristotelian theory of universals, which he inherited; its great and shining merits are due to that incomparable analytical genius which was his own. Premising that “a thing exists as an End in Nature, whenever it is cause and effect of itself,” Kant first unfolds this conception of a self-evolving *causa sui* in the concrete example of a tree. He shows that a tree is both cause and effect of itself in reproduction, in growth, and in reparation: (1) one tree is the cause of another tree in natural re-

¹*Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, Werke, V. 382-390.

production, and simply duplicates its own generic self, when it preserves itself permanently as a genus or kind;¹ (2) a tree is the cause of its own individual being, in a way inexplicable by merely mechanical laws, inasmuch as it is not only perpetually rebuilding its own organic structure according to the original type, but also perpetually elaborating for itself afresh the organic material out of which it thus rebuilds, by communicating to this very material its peculiar specific quality and constitution; (3) even a part of the tree, as a bud or a graft, so reproduces itself as to show that the part and the whole are reciprocally dependent, since, on the one hand, the leaf-eye of one tree, inoculated in the twig of another, becomes the cause of a structural growth according to its original kind alone, while, on the other hand, all the leaves of any tree are themselves products or effects of the whole tree as such; and, further, the same causal reciprocity manifests itself in the self-reparation of organic injuries. Kant next proceeds to distinguish between the two great kinds of causes, the efficient or real and the final or ideal. In the concatenation or series of efficient causes, each term stands as effect of its antecedent and as cause of its consequent, but not otherwise; the series moves forward only, never backward; in a single pair of terms, the first is always cause and the second always effect; there is no reciprocity whatever. But this is not true in the series of final causes. For example, the house is the cause of the rent, yet the

¹ Observe how completely Kant is here dominated by Aristotle's notion that the universal inheres in the individual. The tree's kind (*Gattung*) is simply the essential nature common to all trees and found in every tree; hence, in reproduction, the parent-tree literally and merely reproduces *itself* in the offspring-tree, since, in both, this tree-nature is one and the same. Just so, under the same influence, argues Hegel (*Werke*, VI. 192): "The *Many* are, however, the one what the other is; each is One, or One of the Many; they are, therefore, one and the same." That is, to illustrate, the many horses, as individuals, have only one universal nature, which makes them all alike; each is what the others are; they are all, therefore, essentially, *one and the same specific horse*. Both to Kant and to Hegel, as to Aristotle, the *individual differences* are of no account, no scientific or philosophic value, and are therefore completely thrown away; nothing is retained but this one specific nature, absolutely identical in every specimen. Neither sees that this abstract concept of the *Gattung*, the vaunted *Begriff* itself, is a mere consequence of the infirmity of the limited human imagination. But what a chasm between them and Darwin!

idea of the rent, in the first place, was the cause of the house. Here each term is cause and each is effect of the other ; the series moves both forward and backward ; there is complete reciprocity. Now the organism exhibits reciprocity in the relation of cause and effect, which thereby becomes the relation of end and means ; and Kant defines it accordingly. "An organized product of Nature," he says, "is that in which everything is *end*, and, reciprocally, also *means*." Such, in brief (omitting much), is the result of Kant's analysis of the organism, and he himself applies it to human society, in a footnote, as follows :

"Every member of an organization should certainly, in such a whole, be not simply *means*, but also at the same time *end*, and, since he co-operates in the possibility of the whole, be reciprocally determined by the idea of the whole according to his own place and function."

In only one point is it necessary here to criticise Kant's profound conception of the organism, but this point is vital. He nowhere brings out, even if he had it in mind, the far-reaching distinction between what may be called the indwelling and the outgoing, or the immanent and the exient, in all organic life—and all life is organic. He has much to say about "external teleology" as a relation between things of different kinds, more particularly as "advantageousness of one thing for others." But he overlooks a fact which is vital to ethics: namely, that every organism, and every organ in it, lives *partly for itself* and *partly for another*—is both end and means to itself and at the same time both end and means to another. That to live is, for an organism, to be both end and means to itself, Kant sees ; but that to live is also to be both end and means to another, to wit, an including organism, he fails to see, or at least to say. For instance, in the human body, every constituent cell lives a special life of its own, is born, grows, decays, dies, and is excreted ; but, while it lives, it lives no less in the larger and longer general, or systemic, life of the whole. Its life for itself, by which it is both end and means to itself, is only possible through its life for the whole, by which it is both end and means to another ; and, conversely, its life for the whole is only possible through its life for itself. The unflinching reciprocity of these two special func-

tions in one and the same general function is the absolute condition of any life at all. Thus the finger must live for itself, as its immanent end, and appropriate to itself its own due share of the general nutriment, or it must wither for want of food and become useless to the hand ; conversely, the finger must live for the hand, as its exient end, and enter into the hand's functions with its own due share of co-operation, or it must wither for want of exercise and perish as a finger. The case is precisely the same with the hand and the arm, with the arm and the trunk, and, in general, with every organ and the whole organism. So, too, if the whole organism undertook to live solely for itself as one system, and refused to minister duly to its constituent organs, it would die ; if all the organs undertook to live solely for themselves in particular and refused to serve each other or the whole, they all would die. But this strict reciprocity between the individual organism and its own organs is not all ; it must obtain no less strictly between the individual organism and the organic species, the universal organism to which the individual organism is itself an organ. Cut off all individuals from communion and co-operation with each other in their kind, and it and they must perish together. Every organ and every organism has thus a two-fold end, immanent as life for itself, and exient as life for another ; and these two ends, each realizable through the other alone, constitute that total organic end which links organ to organ in the organism, and organism to organism in the species or kind. In this organic constitution of all life, with its characteristic principle of reciprocal finality as both immanent and exient, lies the scientific and philosophic foundation of ethical theory. Out of the simple organism, through ascending grades of animality and increasing consciousness, has been at last evolved the person ; but the person bears in himself still the organic constitution, which, ripening in the light of self-consciousness into the ethical constitution, ripens also the principle of organic finality into the principle of personal ethicality. Precisely, however, because organic finality is itself both immanent and exient, personal ethicality becomes intelligible only as egoistic and altruistic in social ethicality ; and thus, in ethics, individualism leads

necessarily to universalism, not as denial of individualism, but as absorption of it in wider, deeper, and higher thought.

Thus the natural foundation of ethics is the organic constitution as such, which, unconscious of itself so long as it remains merely vegetative, is developed into the personal-social constitution, as soon as it rises in the course of evolution into the form of ethical self-consciousness. The characteristic principle of the organism as such has now been shown to be that of an all-embracing *reciprocity of ends and means*, by which (1) each part lives immanently for itself, and exiently for the whole, while (2) the whole lives immanently for itself, as all its own parts, and exiently for a higher whole, as the genus of which it is itself a species, the inclusive organism of which it is itself an organ. The vegetative organism knows nothing of its own constitution, which at bottom is the self-manifestation of the All-Conscious in the form of the Unconscious. But the social organism rises gradually into self-conscious knowledge of its own constitution, in proportion as the individual ideals of its many constituent persons gradually coalesce in a universal social ideal. To effect this coalescence is the proper aim of philosophy as ethical theory; and it can be effected solely by making clear to all the organic constitution of the social ideal itself. Let us, then, study the social ideal a little more closely.

The general principle that "society is an organism," in recognition of which the most diverse schools (e. g. Kant and Comte, Hegel and Herbert Spencer) agree, means, in the light of the foregoing analysis, that the individual man is actually an organ to society as an actual organism; and that both maintain their healthy existence solely by actual reciprocity of ends and means. This is the real constitution of the human world, as determined by science and philosophy alike. Hence, because it is the nature of man, when pressed by evil, to dream dreams of a possible good, and to form plans for realizing it in the world, each and every one of us shapes some ideal of his own for the betterment of the general condition. In fact, the times exhibit, as never before, a swarm of conflicting, often self-destructive ideals of this possible "good," and there seems to be no acknowledged standard of reference by which to make plain

their wisdom or unwisdom. Yet Nature sets before us, easily to be read if we will but read it, her own ideal of the "good" in the organic constitution; for health is the unmistakable proof of the attainment of Nature's end, while disease is the equally unmistakable proof of its partial defeat. Why not apply to the ideal world this universal lesson of the real world, and shape our social ideal accordingly? For the ideal world is only the real world as it ought to be, and what it ought to be can be realized solely by developing what it is.

Judged by this principle, the ideal "good for man" is a more complete objective realization of his own organic constitution. Precisely as the person is related to society, so should the personal ideal be related to the social ideal. If the organic constitution is itself Nature's own ideal of the "good," evidenced by health as her reward for obedience to it and by disease as her punishment for disobedience to it, then it follows that person and society stand under the absolute moral obligation of realizing in conduct, personal and associated alike, that reciprocity of ends and means which is the fundamental law of the organic constitution. In this absolute authority of the organic constitution, as the very condition of life itself, and therefore, as the self-revealed and eternal ethical law of Nature herself, lies the ultimate reason, the authoritative and unanswerable "why," of all moral obligation.

Here, then, we have the reply to what Professor Sidgwick propounds as the two great ultimate questions of all ethical speculation: namely, "What is Right?" and "Why should I do it?" Right is actual, not merely intentional, conformity of conduct to the organic constitution. The reason why I should do it is that, by willing it, I will the health of the social organism, while, by willing the opposite, I will the disease, and so far the death, of the social organism. For in vain shall I seek (and herein lies the failure of all individualism in ethics) to separate my own health or my own disease from that of the organic body of which I am merely an organ or member. Disease of the lungs, or stomach, or heart, is itself disease of the body; the health of these is so far health of the body. Tersely but truly put, virtue is the will to live, and vice is the will

to die. When I will to live, by willing to obey the law of the organic constitution, I so far will at once my own life and that of the organism in which alone my own life is possible. When I will to die, by willing to disobey that law, I so far will at once my own death and that of society—am guilty, not only of suicide, but also of murder. In brief, since, on the one hand, all life is organism, and, on the other hand, all organism is reciprocity of ends and means in life, “Right” itself may be shortly defined as “Reciprocity,” the one word which, largely understood, declares the whole ethical ideal. Hence no ethical saying ever transcended the lofty meaning of Confucius, if he meant all that his words contain :

“Tsze-kung asked, saying, ‘Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one’s life?’ The Master said, ‘Is not RECIPROCITY such a word? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.’”¹

It will doubtless be noticed how sternly objective and realistic are these answers to the two great ethical questions. But from this objectivity there is no escape. Ignorance of the law, in Nature as in the civil courts, is no excuse for transgression of it, and counts merely in mitigation of penalty. When I mistake poison for food, I die; my innocence is no reprieve from death. The unintentional wrongs of life make up more than half its misery, and “I did not mean to” brings little relief to a burdened conscience. The organic law of the world, written in every living organism as on tablets of stone, is irrevocable and inexorable; and we are all bound, as rational beings, to master it by understanding and obeying it. There is no other way. What this law exacts, not as your idea or mine, not as human idea at all, but as actual and vital fact, as the very condition of life itself, is all-pervading reciprocity of ends and means in the total constitution of everything that lives. This is organism, and organism is the ethical universal itself.

In the vegetative and animal organism, reciprocity of ends and means appears as *harmony*—simple harmony of organ and function in healthful vital equilibrium, in a self-moving, self-sustaining, and

¹ *Confucian Analects*, XV. 23. The mere difference of form between the positive and negative expressions of the Golden Rule is absolutely immaterial; each, fairly construed, contains the other.

self-evolving whole of purely organic parts, each of which repeats in itself, as a smaller and included whole, the same organic constitution.

But in the moral organism (which is such by no mere metaphor or vague analogy, but rather such by the most literal and most rigidly scientific use of words, as the highest known form of real organization) this reciprocity of ends and means, this living harmony of organ and function in the person and in society, appears as *justice*—simple justice, equity, equality, in healthful ethical equilibrium, in a self-moving, self-sustaining, and self-evolving whole as an organism of persons, each of whom repeats in himself, as a smaller and included whole, a still deeper union of the organic and the personal constitutions. Through self-consciousness or self-knowledge, reciprocity of ends and means is exalted from unconscious harmony to conscious justice, and the constitutive principle of the mere organism is deepened, expanded, and elevated into the constitutive principle of the organism of persons. By this development individualism is swallowed up in universalism—not denied or displaced, but shown to be only one side or element in the divine truth of the real world.

The one absolute and all-inclusive word in ethics is “justice.” Grounded in reciprocity of ends and means as organic harmony, its ethical formula is, perhaps, the ancient *cuique suum*—“to each his own,” “give every man his due.” If my neighbor is in misery, I owe him relief; if he is in happiness, I owe him sympathy; if he is a hero, I owe him admiration; if he is a sneak, I owe him contempt; if he is an oppressor, I owe him indignation and resistance; if he is oppressed, I owe him pity and succor; if he is a victim of vice, I owe him an effort to reform him; if he is good and affectionate, if he loves me, I owe him reciprocating love; and so on to the end. This, and nothing less, is reciprocity or justice between man and man, according to their varying characters, conditions, and capacities. Reciprocity between the individual and society is well formulated in the old saying—“each for all and all for each”; and perhaps I may be pardoned for quoting here an attempt of my own to express a little more fully the essential ideal of social reciprocity, in

the form of a sketch designed long ago to serve as the basis of organization for a free religious association :—

“PREAMBLE : *Whereas*, The grand end of human society is the freest, fullest, and highest development of the individual, and the special end of every minor organization should be in harmony with, and in furtherance of, this general end of society itself ; and

“*Whereas*, The grand end of the individual soul is the realization, in itself and in the world, of the highest Ideal of Humanity, and is thus identical with the great cause of universal human progress :

“*Article I.* Therefore, we hereby associate ourselves into a Free Brotherhood, for the purpose of helping each other and our fellow-men in the endeavor after the perfect Spirit, Life, and Truth.

“*Article II.* The only condition of fellowship shall be sympathy with our purpose, and willingness to co-operate in it.”¹

In this large meaning or conception of the word, *reciprocal justice* is itself the *social ideal*, covering alike reciprocity between man and man and reciprocity between the individual and society. But reciprocal justice is not to be accomplished on the Benthamite principle: “Everybody to count for one, nobody to count for more than one.” That maxim is pure individualism—finds universal humanity immanent in every individual, despises and wipes out all individual differences, and treats all men as absolutely alike and of equal worth. Not so universalism. This treats all men as partly alike and partly different, respects the likeness no more than the unlikeness, and seeks to cultivate in every man his individual difference in perfect conformity to his universal nature, whereby his personal ideal itself is subordinated to the universal social ideal of reciprocal justice as his “higher law.” The moral “worth” of a man is proportioned to the degree of his free self-subordination to the social organism as his true universal.

Here emerges to view the profound objectivity or realism of universalism in ethics. “Right” becomes something infinitely more than the individual’s mere purity of intention, mere rightness of purpose, mere “virtue” or “perfection,” which is held up by in-

¹ *The Radical*. A Monthly Magazine devoted to Religion. Edited by Sidney H. Morse. Boston : Adams & Co., 25 Broomfield St.—article on “Organization,” in the number for December, 1866.

dividualism and idealism as the complete ethical ideal. If Kant, as we saw, found nothing in the world or outside of it which could possibly be conceived as unqualifiedly good except the "good will,"—and if Hegel was unable to advance an inch beyond this "Autonomy" of the individual will as such,—not so universalism. Universalism finds nothing unqualifiedly good in the world except *the good will so realized as to work objective justice in the social organism*. The "good will" is merely subjective justice: *the good deed must be both subjective and objective justice*. Subjective justice alone is merely the incomplete right, the half-right, the inner right which may yet be the outer wrong. But objective justice is that inner right which knows enough to make itself the outer right, too. The scientific criterion, and the only truly ethical criterion, of the "right" in human conduct, whether personal or associated, is twofold:

1. The conduct itself must, first of all, actually conform to the organic constitution, that is, must be objectively just; and
2. It must be meant to conform to the organic constitution, that is, must be subjectively just.

The social ideal demands objective justice; the personal ideal demands subjective justice; and no conduct is "right," in the full and high sense of the word, which does not meet both demands in full, by subordinating the personal ideal to the social ideal as its "higher law."

The common notion that the agent is necessarily blameless, if he does but intend to act rightly, is mischievously immoral—Kant and Hegel to the contrary notwithstanding. It is nothing but a piece of pernicious sentimentalism, for it excuses the agent from that painstaking, conscientious, exhaustive, *intellectual investigation of facts*, subsisting objectively to himself in the organic constitution of the human world, which, simply because he is a rational as well as a moral being, he is *bound to learn, to know, and to obey*. Such knowledge is no less his "duty" than is his simple innocence of intention. If, in consequence of this principle, it turns out that "men of good will" *cannot* "find their way without a moral theory," and that the "man of good will" is first of all bound to furnish himself with a good moral theory, that is simply to say that the foundation

of all good conduct is knowledge—that thought must lead, feeling and will must follow : in a word, that Infinite Wisdom has so built up this world on the organic constitution, and on objective justice as its ground-principle, that the fool is constitutionally incapacitated for being a saint.

But, on the other hand, if the personal ideal must find in the social ideal its “higher law” as objective justice, no less must the social ideal find in the personal ideal its own “higher law” as subjective justice. The same reciprocity of ends and means which obtains between society and the person obtains no less between their respective ideals ; otherwise, the ideal itself would not be the “ought to be” of that which “is.” The ethical meaning of this principle is that, when men act together as one organic body, they are bound, in their associated conduct, not only to do justice, but also to intend justice. In other words, their collective conduct should be governed, just as much as their individual conduct, by the very highest and purest ethical intention. They are morally bound to be as intelligent, scrupulous, patient, highminded, honorable, and just, when they act together, as when they act alone. They are bound to study out the real relations between society and the individual, in order that society may do him no wrong, but objective good only, in all its own collective activity. The only just end of collective or social activity is the highest objective good of the individual ; but this just end can never be fulfilled objectively unless it is first willed subjectively. The loftiest standard of integrity, honor, benevolence, justice, and wisdom, should enter into the collective act of the whole,—it should dominate and inspire the act of society,—just as much as it should enter into and inspire the act of the individual ; otherwise, the end of objective justice cannot possibly be realized. In all social action or conduct, if objective justice is the end, subjective justice must be the means ; the end will not be attained unless it is willed to be attained. Hence every person who acts organically with his fellows is as false to them as he is to himself, unless he puts into this associated act the highest principle of his own personal act. If he does this, if all do it, too, then the act of society, on the basis of previous thorough knowledge of what the or-

ganic constitution actually requires in the case at hand, will be both subjectively and objectively just,—in one word, *right*. In this way, the social ideal of objective justice *to all* subordinates itself to the personal ideal of subjective justice *in each*, as its own “higher law,” in the sense that any end must depend upon its only possible means for objective realization.

In this way, likewise, we see clearly why the traditional separation of ethics and politics is a great, grave, and most injurious mistake. Ethics knows no such separation, but claims control of the whole field of politics by right of eminent domain. Political action, just as much as personal action, is conduct ; and ethics is the science of conduct, whether personal or political, individual or national. Hence international law will find a solid ground in reason for its now unsanctioned principles, when it comes to see that the organic constitution, the principle of objective justice, is the fundamental ethical law of the universe—that very “law of Nature” which it has thus far sought for in vain, but which governs the ethical relations of nations no less than it governs those of individuals. Masses of men are still men, and carry men’s personal natures and personal ideals into all their collective actions. When, discarding the terribly false maxim that “corporations have no souls,” and learning that corporations have exactly as many souls and exactly as much soul as have the men that make them, each man elevates his corporate action to the loftiest standard of personal honor, and learns to submit his conduct in politics and in business, no less than in private life, to the eternal law of *objective and subjective justice*, one and indivisible in the constitution of the social organism, then indeed will the world become something better than the den of wild beasts which it now too often seems. For then, whether acting in greater or in smaller masses, whether organized as nations or as minor corporations, many men will have learned to act as one man, and that one man to act by the personal ideal—which is subordination of the social ideal to the personal ideal as its “higher law.”

To recapitulate : the social ideal is the organic constitution of the whole as a whole, conceived as free self-development of society as it is into society as it ought to be ; and its organic principle of

development is objective justice through subjective justice. The personal ideal is the organic constitution of the part as a part, conceived as free self-development of the person as he is into the person as he ought to be : namely, an organ (1) living immanently for himself, (2) living exiently for his inclusive organism, and (3) living these two lives as one, each through the other alone ; and its organic principle of development is subjective justice through objective justice. "Duty," or the "Ought," or "Moral Obligation," is the indefeasible claim of the organic constitution in society and in the universe itself (1) to determine the *ideal aim* in the person, and (2) to determine thereby the *real conduct* of the person. "Objective good" is the organic constitution as such, and "subjective good," or health, is conformity to it ; the "bad" is disease or disorganization, degeneration of the organic into the merely mechanical, relapse of the living reciprocity of ends and means into the lifeless sequence of mere cause and effect. "Virtue" is the will to live, to be an organism ; "vice" is the will to die, to be a corpse or mere machine. "Right" is reciprocity of ends and means, developed by self-consciousness from the simple "harmony" of the organism as such into the objective and subjective "justice" of the person as such. "Perfection," "righteousness," or "virtue," as the essential will to live by realizing the ideal of all life, is the substance of which "happiness" is the shadow—its fitting, natural, and normal accompaniment. But, just as the tropical traveller, when the sun is in the zenith, will find himself accompanied by no shadow save that which is directly under him, so, also, in some torrid tract of self-sacrifice to which duty may conduct him, life's traveller may find himself bereft of all happiness save that which he resolutely tramples beneath his feet. Such was that nameless captain on some Western lake, who, when his vessel caught fire, steered it to the shore against the wind and rescued his passengers from death, while he himself, fanned fiercely by the back-sweeping flames, perished in torture at his post. Heroism of such sublimity as this exhibits a loyalty to the social ideal which paralyzes the tongue of praise, and admits of no explanation by any immanent or self-returning end. The ultimate aim of a martyrdom so pure was necessarily disinterested or

exient—directed not to himself, not to his own “happiness,” not even to his own “goodness,” but simply and solely to the good of those for whom he bore the agony and died. And this is the apotheosis of the human will—its pure self-identification with the Divine Will, its pure self-dedication to God.

Thus universalism in ethics culminates in the principle of EXIENCY—of the exient end and the immanent end as reciprocally necessary to each other, in order to constitute that total organic end by which alone the individual finds his place in Nature, realizes his ideal in Society, and achieves his destiny in God. By this principle of exiency as its innermost ethical content, the organic constitution appears as universal reciprocity of ends and means in Biology, universal co-operation in Sociology, universal objective and subjective justice through universal reciprocal service in Ethics, and universal self-consecration to the Divine in Religion. Substitution, therefore, of universalism for individualism, as the ground-principle both of ethical theory and of ethical practice, constitutes that “advancement of ethics” which is the deepest spiritual need of the modern world.

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